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AVOIDING CLAIMS OF DEFAMATION
IN THE WORKPLACE
THOMAS A. JACOBSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of at-will employment is, for the time being, alive and
well in the state of North Dakota and in most other jurisdictions in the
United States. That is, unless they agree to employment for a specific
duration, both employers and employees generally enjoy the right to
sever their employment relationship at any time and for any reason or
for no reason at all.1 Consequently, most involuntarily terminated
employees cannot take advantage of contract theories when litigating
against their former employers.
As an alternative to remedies under contract law, many employees
seeking compensation have therefore chosen to sue under various tort
theories such as intentional infliction of emotional distress,2 interference
with contract, 3 and even negligent discharge. 4 The most pervasive of
these tort theories, however, is defamation. 5
Defamation claims brought by terminated employees have been a
commonly litigated issue in the employment area.6 However, in recent
years, the damages awarded in defamation cases has drastically
increased. For example, a jury in Burleigh County, North Dakota,
* Thomas A. Jacobson, who was formerly an attorney with the law firm of Nilles, Hansen &
Davies, Ltd., of Fargo, North Dakota, where he concentrated in the areas of employment law and civil
litigation, is now an attorney with the law firm of Swenson, Lervick. Syverson & Anderson in
Alexandria, Minnesota. He graduated summa cum laude from the University of North Dakota in 1987
and with honors from Drake University Law School in 1990. He would like to gratefully acknowledge
the research assistance of Jackie Anderson (University of North Dakota Law School, 1995) without
whose help this article would not have been possible.
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-01 (1987): Osterman-Levitt v. Medquest, Inc.. 513 N.W.2d 70, 72
(N.D. 1994); Rykowsky v. Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 508 N.W.2d 348, 349 (N.D. 1993);
Bykonen v. United Hosp., 479 N.W.2d 140, 141 (N.D. 1992); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n,
407 N.W.2d 206, 212 (N.D. 1987).
2. Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., 498 N.W.2d 174, 177 (N.D. 1993).
3. Demetracopoulos v. Wilson. 640 A.2d 279, 281-82 (N.H. 1994); Hennum v. City of Medina,
402 N.W.2d 327, 328 (N.D. 1987).
4. Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067. 1080-81 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
5. See Rykowsky, 508 N.W.2d at 350-51; Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, 467 N.W.2d 73,
77-78 (N.D. 1991); Little v. Spaeth, 394 N.W.2d 700,705 (N.D. 1986); Eli v. Griggs County Hosp. &
Nursing Home, 385 N.W.2d 99. 101 (N.D. 1986); Gowin v. Hazen Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 311
N.W.2d 554,557 (N.D. 1981).
6. The following cases illustrate defamation claims brought by terminated employees: Boston
Mut. Life Ins. v. Varone, 303 F.2d 155 (lst Cir. 1962); Johnson v. Independent Life & Accident Ins.,
94 F. Supp. 959 (E.D.S.C. 1951); Caslin v. General Elec. Co., 608 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980);
Stuempges v. Parke. Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980); McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co..
235 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1975); Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 138 A.2d 24 (NJ. 1958).
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recently awarded $1.2 million in general damages and $700,000.00 in
punitive damages to a man the jury found had been defamed when his
former employer sent a series of letters falsely stating that he had been
"terminated for cause." 7 Awards of over $2 million,8 $150,000.00,9 and
$100,000.00l0 have also been reported. Moreover, these costs do not
include the significant attorney's fees that the employer will be forced to
incur during the litigation process. The purpose of this article is to
provide a basic outline of a workplace defamation claim and some
practical suggestions that may help employers avoid such claims.,I
II. ANATOMY OF A WORKPLACE DEFAMATION CLAIM
A. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM
Under North Dakota law, every person has the right of protection
from defamation.12 Defamation can be effected by libel or slander.l3
Libel is essentially the written form of defamation, 14 while slander is
defamation by other means such as the spoken word.15  The essential
elements of a workplace defamation claim include the publication (i.e.,
communication to a third party) by the employer of false and
unprivileged information that defames the employee.16
7. Vanover v. Kansas City Life Ins., No. - Civ. - (Burleigh County Dist. Ct. N.D. Sept. 19,
1995).
8. Brooks v. Doherty, Rumble & Butler, 481 N.W.2d 120, 124 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
9. Murray v. HeathEast, No. C4-90-1472 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct. Minn. Mar. 7, 1991).
10. Keenan v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 13 F.3d 1266, 1268 (8th Cir. 1994).
II. The authority for this article is based primarily on North Dakota and Minnesota law.
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-01 (1991).
13. Id. § 14-02-02.
14. Id. § 14-02-03. Under this section "civil libel" is defined as "a false and unprivileged publi-
cation by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any
person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or
which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." Id.
15. Id. at § 14-02-04. Under this section "civil slander" is defined as:
[A] false and unprivileged publication other than libel, which:
1. Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished
for crime-
2. Imputes to him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome
disease;
3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade, or business,
either by imputing to him general disqualifications in those respects which the office or
other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his
office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits;
4. Imputes to him impotence or want of chastity; or
5. By natural consequence causes actual damage.
Id.
16. See Gowin v. Hazen Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 311 N.W.2d 554, 557 (N.D. 1981). In
Minnesota, there is no statutory cause of action for defamation. However, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has relied upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS in holding that an employee can be
defamed if the employer publishes a false statement which is about the employee and which also tends
248
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B. TYPES OF COMMUNICATIONS WHICH, IF FALSE AND UNPRIVILEGED,
MAY BE ACTIONABLE
One of the most frequent bases for workplace defamation claims is
statements by the employer that tend to injure the employee's business
reputation. For example, in Vanover v. Kansas City Life Insurance,17 the
jury found that an employee was defamed when his former employer
falsely stated that he had been "terminated for cause." 18 In another
example, an employer was held liable for falsely reporting to an
employment agency that a former employee was a "poor salesman,"
"not industrious," "fired because he sold on friendship," and "did not
belong in sales."19 Furthermore, employers have been held liable for
falsely stating that employees were fired for "gross insubordination" 20
and for falsely accusing an employee of erasing computer tapes.21
Sometimes, the defamatory statement stems from an accusation that
the employee was involved in criminal activity. 22 Frequently, this occurs
when the employer suspects the employee of theft23 or drug use. 24 If the
implication of the statement is that the employee was involved in any
type of criminal activity, the statement may be actionable. 25
"to harm the [employee's] reputation and to lower him in the estimation of the community."
Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252,255 (Minn. 1980).
17. No. - Civ. - (Burleigh County Dist. Ct. N.D. Sept. 19, 1995).
18. Vanover v. Kansas City Life Ins., No. - Civ. - (Burleigh County Dist. Ct. N.D. Sept. 19,
1995).
19. Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 255, 259.
20. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986).
21. Staples v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 561 A.2d 499,501-02 (Me. 1989). See also Keenan v.
Computer Assocs. Int'l, 13 F.3d 1266, 1275 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that an employee was defamed
when he was forced to disclose to prospective employers that he had been terminated for "poor
performance"); Brooks v. Doherty, Rumble & Butler, 481 N.W.2d 120, 129 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(determining that employee was defamed when he was terminated based on false reasons); Murray v.
HeathEast. No. C4-90-1472 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct. Minn., Mar. 7, 1991) (finding an employee, who
was a nurse, was defamed when several other employees stated that he had contributed to the death of
a patient).
22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-04(1) (1991).
23. See, Miles v. Perry, 529 A.2d 199. 213 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that statements
concerning secretary's handling of finances amounted to an accusation of theft); Karnes v. Milo
Beauty & Barber Supply, 441 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (accusing employee of stealing
money from cash register drawer); Smithson v. Nordstom, Inc., 664 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Or. Ct. App.
1983) (finding sufficient evidence for jury determination that an employee was falsely accused of
theft); Lawrence v. Jewell Cos., 193 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Wis. 1972) (noting as slander an accusation
that employee had overcharged customers and had stolen money from employer).
24. Nicklow v. Menard, Inc., No. C2-91-2053, 1992 WL 153434 (Minn. Ct. App. July 7, 1992)
(holding that an employee was defamed by being released from job for drug use when the employee
had not in fact used drugs).
25. See, e.g., Babb v. Minder, 806 F.2d 749, 759 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a statement by a
manager that a former employee had shown her bare buttocks was defamatory per se as sufficient to
impute crime of indecent exposure).
1996] 249
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Courts have also recognized workplace defamation claims where
employees have been accused of sexual misconduct. 26 For example, a
cartoon drawn by co-worker depicting a female employee and male
coworker in a sexually compromising position was found actionable
because it imputed a lack of chastity to the female. 27 Similarly,
statements made by an employer that an employee was having sexual
relations with his daughter were held to be defamatory per se.28
Of course, not all disparaging remarks are actionable. Generally, a
defamation claim cannot be based on statements of opinion. 2 9
Although, the United States Supreme Court has stated that not all
opinion is automatically protected and that the distinction between fact
and opinion is artificial, 30 there have been numerous phrases or terms
which courts have determined are simply not actionable.
For example, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that mere
name-calling and the use of opprobrious epithets is not actionable. 31 In
Meier v. Novak,32 the defendant called the plaintiff an "asshole," and
the court found that the defendant could not be held liable for this
comment. 33 The court stated that the word "imputes no characteristic,
habit, or condition which would fall within the definition of slander
contained in our statute," and that although the word is "ill-mannered,
rude, and objectionable in the extreme, especially when used in public, it
does not constitute a basis for a cause of action for slander in this
setting."34
Similarly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently noted that terms
such as "brown nose," "shit heads," "favoritism," "Dick Lund,"
"sick" and "move-ups" are not actionable. 35 The court has also
rejected actions based on the following words or phrases: "couldn't cut
it;"36 "senseless drivel," "gross injustice" and "crass insult" when
26. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-04(4) (1991).
27. Linebaugh v. Sheraton Michigan Corp., 497 N.W.2d 585, 597 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
28. Brown v. Farkas, 511 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (111. App. Ct. 1986). See also Delaney v. Taco Time
Int'l. 681 P.2d 114, 118 (Or. 1984) (noting that words in a written report that an employee caused
dissension in the workplace because her supervisor refused to sleep with her were arguably
defamatory).
29. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (stating that "[ulnder the First
Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea").
30. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990).
31. Meier v. Novak, 338 N.W.2d 631,635 (N.D. 1983).
32. 338 N.W.2d 631 (N.D. 1983).
33. Meier v. Novak, 338 N.W.2d 631,635 (N.D. 1983).
34. Id.
35. Lund v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 467 N.W.2d 366, 369-69 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991).
36. Gant v. Mohaney, Dougherty, & Mahoney, No. C6-90-571. 1990 WL 105956. at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. July 31, 1990).
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describing a letter; 37  "fluffy," "bitch," "flirtatious;" 38 "out of
control," "emotional," a "bad influence," "not a team player," and
not "technically strong." 39 The United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota has rejected similar claims based on words such as
"complainer," "troublemaker," 40 "hard to work with" and "rude." 4 1
C. PUBLICATION
However, even the most disparaging remark made to an employee
alone is not actionable. In order for a disparaging remark to be
actionable, it must also be published.42 That is, it must be communicated
to someone other than the plaintiff/employee. 43 Because of the number
of ways in which employers must communicate with their employees,
there is great potential for employers to mistakenly disclose defamatory
information. And, as employers begin to communicate more through
technology such as electronic mail and the Internet, these media will also
become sources of potential liability. Thus, the key is to identify the
possible sources of defamatory information and to then control its
dissemination.
Written communications are fertile ground for litigation.
Essentially, any intracompany communication may constitute
publication, even though the publication may be privileged.4 4 For
example, although employers usually enjoy the privilege to
communicate disciplinary and performance information, employees
have frequently sued for disparaging remarks made about them in
disciplinary notices and written evaluations. 45 Similarly, memoranda
37. Erven v. Provost, 413 N.W.2d 861,863 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
38. Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Comm'n, 428 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
39. Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
40. Thompson v. Campbell, 845 F. Supp. 665, 680 (D. Minn. 1994). See also McGrath v. TCF
Bank Sav., FSB, 502 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), modified on other grounds by, McGrath
v. TCF Bank Sav., FSB, 509 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1993) (addressing the term "troublemaker").
41. Schibursky v. IBM, 820 F. Supp. 1169,1182 (D. Minn. 1993).
42. See, e.g., Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (noting
that disparaging statements, if true, are not actionable and that letter of termination did not constitute
publication).
43. Emo v. Milbank Mut. Ins., 183 N.W.2d 508, 512 (N.D. 1971) (citing Dvorak v. Kuhn, 175
N.W.2d 697, 703 (N.D. 1970)). See also Rouse v. Dunkley & Bennett, 520 N.W.2d 406,411 (Minn.
1994) (citing Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 886 (Minn. 1986))
(discussing publication and communication with regard to defamation); Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess
Hosp., 23 N.W.2d 247, 251 (N.D. 1946) (defining publication in defamation context).
44. See Rickbeil, 23 N.W.2d at 256 (holding that dictation to and subsequent transcription by
secretary was a publication); see also Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn.
1986) (holding that preparation of a defamatory letter and distribution constitutes publication). See
infra part III.C. (discussing privilege defense).
45. See, e.g., Caslin v. General Elec., 608 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (involving
allegations of libelous performance appraisals of employee by supervisor); Bratt v. IBM, 467 N.E.2d
126, 130 (Mass. 1984) (involving personnel director's memorandum regarding employee's mental
19961
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prepared during internal investigations of misconduct such as alleged
sexual harassment and theft have also generated litigation.46 However,
when investigating sexual harassment cases, employers will generally be
protected by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
mandate that employers "take all steps necessary to prevent sexual
harassment." 47 Company publications such as newsletters can also be a
source of defamatory information. 48 Likewise, graffiti in the form of
derogatory cartoons or otherwise could be interpreted as defamatory. 49
Thus, it is clear that any written or other graphic communication which is
disseminated to a third party will satisfy the publication element of a
workplace defamation claim.
Clearly, an employee can also be defamed by the spoken word.
Typically, this occurs when the employer makes disparaging remarks
about the employee during the evaluation, disciplinary, or discharge
process. As with written comments made at these stages of employment,
oral remarks will generally be protected as privileged. 50 Nevertheless,
they are a frequent basis for workplace defamation claims.
For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court found in favor of an
employee who was first accused of theft and then publicly fired at an
employee meeting where the manager stressed the store's policy against
theft.51 The Oregon Court of Appeals has also found for an employee
who was defamed when the company's general manager reported at a
meeting of about 120 other employees that the employee was fired
because he had been "drunk and misbehaving in a bar" and "had a
drinking problem." 52
One particularly difficult area is that of employee references. An
employer who discusses a problematic employee with another
prospective employer is faced with a dilemma: tell the whole truth, even
if that means risking a defamation lawsuit by disclosing disparaging
information about the employee; or, withhold information that would be
condition); Daywalt v. Montgomery Hosp., 573 A.2d 1116, 1117 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (involving
personnel director's memorandum regarding suspected alteration of timecard by employee).
46. Stockley v. AT&T Info. Sys., 687 F. Supp. 764, 768 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing
memorandum implicating employee in sexual harassment case); Karnes v. Milo Beauty & Barber
Supply, 441 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (referring to memorandum about employee theft
circulated to various management personnel).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1995). See Stockley v. AT&T Info. Sys., 687 F. Supp. at 769
(agreeing that communications made in connection with sexual harassment investigations are
protected by a qualified privilege).
48. Zinda v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548,549 (Wis. 1989).
49. See Linebaugh v. Sheraton Michigan Corp., 497 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)
(finding that a cartoon depicting plaintiff engaged in sexual act is actionable for libel).
50. See infra notes 104-142 and accompanying text (discussing privilege defense).
51. Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Minn. 1990).
52. Benassi v. Georgia-Pacific, 662 P.2d 760, 763-67 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
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helpful to the prospective employer. This "conflict" has created a
dilemma for the courts. As the Minnesota Supreme Court stated,
"unless a significant privilege is recognized by the courts, employers
will decline to evaluate honestly their former employees' work
records," 53 yet employees must also be protected from "malicious
undercutting by a former employer." 54
Thus, although the courts generally recognize that "[e]mployment
references-are conditionally privileged because the public interest is best
served by encouraging accurate assessments of an employee's
performance," 55 employers may be held liable if they make defamatory
statements about a former employee to that employee's new or
prospective employer. 56 Likewise, employers have been held liable for
defamatory statements made to employment agencies.57
Problems also arise when the employees themselves publish the
defamatory information to new or prospective employers. Under certain
circumstances, the doctrine of compelled self-disclosure may make the
employer liable even if it is the employees who do the publishing.
One of the leading cases on this issue is the Minnesota Supreme
Court's decision in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States.58 In Lewis, the plaintiffs were fired for "gross
insubordination," even though the employer admitted that their
production and performance were satisfactory and even commendable.59
The employer also admitted that the real problems could have been
prevented had management provided the plaintiffs with proper
guidelines .60
The employer in Lewis never published the "gross insubor-
dination" statement to any of the plaintiffs' prospective employers. 61
However, the plaintiffs themselves were requested by potential employers
to disclose the reasons for their departures from their former employer,
and each of them stated she had been fired for "gross
insubordination." 62 Under these circumstances the court found that the
53. Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252,257 (Minn. 1980).
54. Id. at 258.
55. Hunt v. University of Minnesota, 465 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
56. Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng'g, 401 N.W.2d 655. 657-58 (Minn. 1987); Walsh v.
Consolidated Freightways, 563 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Or. 1977); Geyer v. Steinbronn, 506 A.2d 901, 904
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612,617-18 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
57. Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 258.
58. 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
59. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 389 N.W.2d 876, 881-82 (Minn. 1986).
60. Id. at 882.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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plaintiffs had established the publication element of their defamation
claims:
The concept of compelled self-publication does no more than
hold the originator of the defamatory statement liable for
damages caused by the statement whereby the originator
knows, or should know, of circumstances whereby the defamed
person has no reasonable means of avoiding publication of the
statement or avoiding the resulting damages; in other words, in
cases where the defamed person was compelled to publish the
statement....
Accordingly, we hold that in an action for defamation, the
publication requirement may be satisfied where the plaintiff
was compelled to publish a defamatory statement to a third
person if it was foreseeable to the defendant that the plaintiff
would be so compelled. 63
Several jurisdictions have adopted this doctrine. 64  One
encyclopedic reference further states that:
[T]he publication by the plaintiff of defamatory matter
received by him is sufficient to support an action if disclosure
is the natural and probable consequence of its receipt, or if the
sender intends that it shall be communicated to a third
person .65
In response to the Lewis case, the state of Minnesota enacted
legislation which protects an employer's freedom to communicate
information about its former employees. 66 The resulting statute
63. Id. at 888. See also Keenan v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 13 F.3d 1266, 1269-70 (8th Cir. 1994)
(applying Minnesota law); Pfluger v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 967 F.2d 1218, 1220 (8th Cir. 1992)
(applying Minnesota law, but finding that the self-publication was not compelled).
64. Compelled self-publication doctrine is illustrated in the following: Elmore v. Shell Oil Co.,
733 F. Supp. 544, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94-95
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1344 (Colo. 1988); Grist v.
Upjohn Co.. 168 N.W.2d 389. 405 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); Neighbors v. Kirksville College of
Osteopathic Medicine. 694 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). See generally David P. Chapus.
Annotation, Publication of Allegedly Defamatory Matter by Plaintiff ("Self-Publication ") As Sufficient
to Support Defamation Action, 62 A.L.R.4th 616 (1988) (analyzing cases discussing the doctrine of
compelled self-publication).
65. 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel & Slander § 164 (1970).
66. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 181.933 (West 1987). This statute provides:
Subd. 1. Notice required. An employee who has been involuntarily terminated may,
within five working days following such termination, request in writing that the employer
inform the employee of the reason for the termination. Within five working days
following receipt of such request, an employer shall inform the terminated employee in
writing of the truthful reasons for the termination.
Subd. 2. Defamation action prohibited. No communication of the statement furnished by
the employer to the employee under subdivision I may be made the subject of any action
[VOL. 72:247
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essentially affords an employer protection from defamation liability if
the employer provides the employee with the employer's truthful
reasons for the termination pursuant to subdivision 1 of section
121.933.67 There are also a number, of courts that have rejected
compelled self-publication as a basis for a defamation claim. 68 North
Dakota employers do not, however, enjoy such statutory immunity.
It does appear that defamation by conduct alone, where an
employer does not speak or write a defamatory remark, is not action-
able.69 In Bolton v. Department of Human Services,7O the plaintiff had
been employed as a social work specialist for the Fergus Falls Regional
Treatment Center. 71 Due to an alleged conflict of interest and a problem
relating to a guardianship issue, the center terminated him and provided
him with a letter setting forth the reasons for the termination. 72 The
center's chief executive officer then told the plaintiff to collect his
personal belongings and to leave the premises immediately. 73 The CEO
also followed company policy and instructed another of the center's
directors to escort the plaintiff out of the building. 74 Following these
instructions, the director escorted the plaintiff back to his office. 75 This
walk took less than one minute.76 So as to not draw attention to the
situation, the director deliberately walked behind the plaintiff and did
not communicate with him.77 The director then waited while the plaintiff
for libel, slander, or defamation by the employee against the employer.
Id.
67. See Huthwaite v. H.B. Fuller Co., No. C8-91-2090, 1992 WL 95879 (Minn. Ct. App. May 12,
1992) (rejecting defamation claim where the employer complied with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.933(!)).
68. See De Leon v. St. Joseph Hosp., 871 F.2d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the state
of Maryland would reject the doctrine of compelled self-publication because it "might visit liability for
defamation on every Maryland employer each time a job applicant is rejected"); Yeitrakis v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 804 F. Supp. 238, 250 (D.N.M. 1992) (holding that the state of New Mexico
would reject the doctrine of compelled self-publication); Hensley v. Armstrong World Indus., 798 F.
Supp. 653, 657 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (holding that the state of Oklahoma would reject the doctrine of
compelled self-publication); Ritter v. Pepsi Cola Operating Co., 785 F. Supp. 61, 64 (M.D. Pa. 1992)
(applying Pennsylvania law in rejecting the compelled self-publication doctrine); Mandelblatt v.
Perelman, 683 F. Supp. 379, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting compelled self-publication claim on the
basis that any self-publication was not "strongly compelled"); Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply, 569
N.E.2d 1104, 1111 (11. App. Ct. 1991) (refusing to recognize tort of compelled self-defamation);
Hoover v. Livingston Bank, 451 So. 2d 3. 5 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that only publication was by
plaintiff); Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022, 1025 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding
publication requirement not satisfied through proof of compelled self-publication) Lunz v. Neuman,
290 P.2d 697, 701-02 (Wash. 1955) (holding employer not liable for plaintiff's own statements in
subsequent employment applications).
69. Bolton v. Department of Human Servs., 540 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1995).
70. 540 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1995).
71. Bolton v. Department of Human Servs., 540 N.W.2d 523, 523 (Minn. 1995).
72. Id. at 524.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Bolton, 540 N.W.2d at 524.
77. Id.
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boxed his personal items. 78 From the plaintiff's office, the director
again escorted the plaintiff to the front door, again following him
without a word spoken. 79 This walk lasted about 30-45 seconds. 80 One
co-worker apparently saw the plaintiff carrying the box, saw the director
in the plaintiff's office and "sensed a tense atmosphere." 81 From this
set of facts, the plaintiff sued the center, alleging he was defamed by this
action .82
The district court dismissed the action, and the plaintiff appealed. 83
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and held for the plaintiff,
reasoning as follows:
Language is a "social instrument" used for the
"communication of ideas." . . . It is the "device whereby we
communicate with our fellow men." . . . "Language" may
include gestures or actions; communication is not a captive of
the voice.
In the present situation, Bolton has presented sufficient
evidence that Klein's actions conveyed a "statement" of the
reasons for Bolton's discharge. The statement conveyed was
that Bolton was dishonest and was not to be trusted to leave the
building unaccompanied. The evidence of this "statement"
by Klein is at least sufficient to survive respondents' summary
judgment motion.84
The Minnesota Supreme Court then reversed the Court of
Appeals. 85 In its decision, the Supreme Court first noted that "[i]n
substance, although words and conduct may support each other's
meanings in the defamation context, . . . Minnesota has never recognized
defamation by conduct alone." 86 The court then concluded that "in the
context of these facts, where there is no word spoken or conduct other
than a simple escorting of the plaintiff to the exit door upon his
termination, we conclude that as a matter of law respondent was not
defamed." 87 Thus, although the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the
concept of defamation by action alone under the facts of the Bolton
case, it appears that in Minnesota, the door may still open for such a
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Bolton, 540 N.W.2d at 524.
82. Id. at 525.
83. Bolton v. Department of Human Servs., 527 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
84. Id. at 156-57 (citations omitted).
85. Bolton v. Department of Human Servs., 540 N.W.2d 523, 525 (Minn. 1995).
86. Id. (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 526.
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claim where the conduct is more egregious and/or where the conduct is
combined with the spoken word as well.
The North Dakota Supreme Court does not appear to have had the
opportunity to address this precise issue. However, the court has hinted
that, under the proper set of facts, defamation by conduct alone might be
possible: "Ordinarily, publication in a slander case is accomplished by
the communication of the allegedly defamatory matter to a third party
by spoken words, by transitory gestures, or by any form of
communication other than such form as would make it a libel." 88
III. DEFENSES TO A WORKPLACE DEFAMATION CLAIM
There are a number of defenses which protect employers from
workplace defamation liability. However, some of these defenses, such
as privilege, can be lost. Therefore, it is important for employers to
recognize and preserve these protections.
A. TRUTH
Because the essence of a defamation claim is that the disparaging
matter is false, truth is a complete defense to a claim for workplace
defamation. 89 For example, in Eli v. Griggs County Hospital & Nursing
Home,9O the plaintiff was fired for breach of confidentiality after having
made inappropriate remarks about her supervisor and her employer in
general. 91 A statement summarizing the misconduct was placed in her
personnel file.92 The plaintiff contended that this was defamation, but
the North Dakota Supreme Court found that it was not because it was
true that the plaintiff had made the remarks she was accused of
making .93
Similarly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected a workplace
defamation claim where it was determined that the allegations against the
claimant were true.94 In Gillson,95 the plaintiff sued her supervisor and
her employer for sexual harassment. 96 The supervisor counterclaimed
88. Gowin v. Hazen Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 311 N.W.2d 554,558 (N.D. 1981) (emphasis added)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 568(2)).
89. See Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980) (stating that falsity
is a well-settled element of defamation); Eli v. Griggs County Hosp. & Nursing Home, 385 N.W.2d 99,
101 (N.D. 1986); Meier v. Novak, 338 N.W.2d 631. 635 (N.D. 1983) (noting that to be defamatory,
the statement must be false).
90. 385 N.W.2d 99 (N.D. 1980).
91. Eli v. Griggs County Hosp. & Nursing Home, 385 N.W.2d 99, 100 (N.D. 1980).
92. Id. at 101.
93. Id. at 101-02.
94. Gillson v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 492 N.W.2d 835, 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
95. 92 N.W.2d 835 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
96. Id. at 840.
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for defamation based on a letter written by the plaintiff.97 The letter
stated that other employees had complained about the supervisor and
that the plaintiff's performance review had suffered because of her
rejections of the supervisor's advances. 98 Because these statements were
found to be true, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
case .99
B. LACK OF PUBLICATION
Likewise, even the most false and disparaging remark is not
actionable if it is not published to a third party.100 Thus, if the employer
does not communicate the information to anyone other than the
employee, the employer will generally not be liable.101
However, as previously noted, even if the employer says nothing to
anyone other than the employee, the doctrine of compelled self-
publication may make the employer liable once the employee is forced
to re-publish the statement to others. 102 In these circumstances, it is
important to determine whether the communication was actually self-
published 103 and compelled. 104
C. PRIVILEGE
In order for defamatory matter to be actionable, it must also be
unprivileged. 105 As the North Dakota Supreme Court has noted,
"[p]rivilege is based upon the sound public policy that some
communications are so socially important that the full and unrestricted
exchange of information requires some latitude for mistake." 106 In the
employment context, privilege is the most important defense because it
gives employers the freedom to communicate honestly about their
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 843. See also Wilson v. Minnesota Valley Memorial Hosp., Nos. C6-93-424. CO-93-
1097. 1993 WL 459846 at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 14. 1993) (rejecting defamation claim when alleged
sexual relationship at work was found by the jury to be true).
100. Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding
summary judgment for employer where employee failed to prove that discharge letter was ever
published).
101. Id. at 810-11 (citations omitted).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68 (discussing the doctrine of compelled self-
publication).
103. Rouse v. Dunkley & Bennett, 520 N.W.2d 406.410-11 (Minn. 1994) (holding that plaintiff
failed to meet his burden of proving self-publication where he could not provide names of
interviewers nor documentary evidence of applications, resumes or rejections).
104. Pfluger v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 967 F.2d 1218. 1219-20 (8th Cir. 1992).
105. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-03 (1991) (stating that "[libel is a false and unprivileged
publication") (emphasis added); Id. § 14-02-04 (stating that "[s]lander is a false and unprivileged
publication other than libel") (emphasis added).
106. Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, 467 N.W.2d 73.78 (N.D. 1991) (citations omitted).
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employees. Thus, if a privilege exists, the employer will be immune
from liability even if it causes the publication of false and defamatory
information about an employee. However, as the following discussion
illustrates, an unwary employer can, in some situations, lose the
protection of the privilege defense.
Under North Dakota law a privileged communication is statutorily
defined as follows:
A privileged communication is one made:
1. In the proper discharge of an official duty;
2. In any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any
other proceeding authorized by law;
3. In a communication, without malice, to a person
interested therein by one who also is interested, or by one who
stands in such relation to the person interested as to afford a
reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the
communication innocent, or who is requested by the person
interested to give the information; and
4. By a fair and true report, without malice, of a judicial,
legislative, or other public official proceeding, or of anything
said in the course thereof.
In the cases provided for in subsections 3 and 4, malice is not
inferred from the communication or publication.107
There are two categories of privilege: absolute and qualified or
conditional.1 08 The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that
subdivisions (1) and (2) of section 14-02-05 create an absolute privilege
where the free exchange of information is so important that even
defamatory statements made with actual malice are privileged.109 For
example, comments made during an official proceeding such as a school
board meeting will be absolutely privileged)110
Similarly, Minnesota employers enjoy an absolute privilege under
certain circumstances, such as: during judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, so long as the comment is pertinent and relevant to the
proceeding;I" when required by law;1 2 for statements obtained during a
107. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-05 (1991).
108. Soentgen, 467 N.W.2d at 78.
109. Id. See also Dor v. Peterson, 512 N.W.2d 902,906 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Matthis v.
Kennedy, 67 N.W.2d 413. 417 (Minn. 1954)) (stating that an "[a]bsolute privilege provides complete
immunity for publication of allegedly false and defamatory statements regardless of the actor's
intent").
110. Rykowsky v. Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 508 N.W.2d 348, 351 (N.D. 1993) (applying
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-05(2) (1991)).
111. Dorn, 512 N.W.2d at 906.
112. See, e.g., McIntire v. State, 458 N.W.2d 714, 719-20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding state
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review of the employee's personnel file pursuant to Minnesota's
personnel records review statute, provided that the employer complies
with the statutel"3 and, when the employer responds appropriately to an
employee's statutory request for the reasons for termination.1 14
Like an absolute privilege, a qualified privilege frees an employer
from liability for defamation."l 5 However, a qualified privilege is not
absolute, and it can be lost if it is abused.11 6 Thus, application of the
qualified privilege defense in a workplace defamation case entails a two
pronged analysis. First, the court must determine whether or not the
qualified privilege exists; second, if a qualified privilege is found, the
fact-finder must determine whether or not the privilege has been lost
through abuse."17
Employers enjoy a qualified privilege to communicate about their
employees in a wide variety of situations. As the North Dakota Supreme
Court noted in Soentgen, 118 when considering the qualified privilege
defense in a workplace defamation claim, "[w]e start with the premise
that generally communications by an employer concerning the conduct
of an employee are, when necessary to protect interests of the employer,
qualifiedly privileged."1 19 Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court
acknowledged that as long as an employer's communication about an
employee is made upon a proper occasion, with a proper motive, and
based upon reasonable or probable cause, the communication will be
qualifiedly privileged.120
Applying this analysis, courts have found a qualified privilege to
exist under the following scenarios: comments about investigations into
a physician's competency made by hospital management during a
employer immune from suit where supervisor was required by law to disclose the reasons for the state
employee's discharge).
113. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.962(2) (West 1993). See. e.g., Lloyd v. In Home Health, 523
N.W.2d 2. 3-4 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (applying § 181.962(2)).
114. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.933. See, e.g., LeBaron v. Minnesota Bd. of Pub. Defense, 499
N.W.2d 39,42 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (applying § 181.933).
115. Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, 467 N.W.2d 73, 78 (N.D. 1991). Procedurally, the
employer has the burden of establishing that the qualified privilege exists. Id. at 78-79. Whether or
not there is a qualified privilege is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. If the employer can
establish the qualified privilege, the burden then shifts to the employee to prove that the privilege was
abused. Id. at 78-79. Whether or not the privilege is abused is generally a question of fact for the jury
to determine. Id. at 78. See also Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 890
(Minn. 1986); Utecht v. Shopko Dep't Store, 324 N.W.2d 652,654 (Minn. 1982); Stuempges v. Parke.
Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980); McGrath v TCF Bank Say., FSB, 502 N.W.2d 801,
808 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
116. Soentgen, 467 N.W.2d at 78 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-05(3), (4) (1991)).
117. Id. The Minnesota courts apply a similar two-step analysis. Id.
118. 467 N.W.2d 73 (N.D. 1991).
119. Id. at 79 (citations omitted).
120. Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.. 297 N.W.2d 252,256-57 (Minn. 1980) (citations omitted).
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meeting with the physician;121 during an employee review process;122
while investigating employee misconduct;123 while explaining to other
employees the reasons for an employee's discharge or discipline; 124
while giving references to a former employee's new or prospective
employer;125 and, during the disciplinary process.126 On the other hand,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that there was no qualified
privilege in a case where the defendant's failure to investigate led to the
conclusion that there was no probable cause and/or proper occasion and
motive for the defamatory statement. 127
As previously noted, if the employer can establish that it is protected
by a qualified privilege, then the inquiry shifts to whether the privilege
was lost through abuse. In Soentgen, the North Dakota Supreme Court
analyzed this step as follows:
We turn to whether the defendants abused the qualified
privilege. A qualified privilege is abused if statements are
made with actual malice, without reasonable grounds for
believing them to be true, and on a subject matter irrelevant to
the common interest or duty. The plaintiff must prove actual
malice and abuse of the privilege....
Actual malice is required in order to defeat a qualified
privilege. Actual malice depends on scienter and requires
proof that a statement was made with malice in fact, ill-will, or
wrongful motive. If the occasion is one of qualified privilege,
121. Soentgen, 467 N.W.2d at 79.
122. Puckett v. Cook, 864 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Arkansas law); Caslin v.
General Elec., 608 S.W.2d 69, 70-71 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Bratt v. IBM, 467 N.E.2d 126, 129 (Mass.
1984); Stearns v. Ag-Chem Equip., No. Co-91-933, 1991 WL 209998, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 22,
1991); Clough v. Ertz, 442 N.W.2d 798, 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Kletschka v. Abbott-Northwestern
Hosp., 417 N.W.2d 752,755 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
123. Vackar v. Package Mach., 841 F. Supp. 310, 314-15 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Stockley v. AT&T
Info. Sys., 687 F. Supp. 764, 768-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 235 N.W.2d
371,374 (Minn. 1975); Olson v. Midwest Business Sys., C2-92-1561, 1993 WL 205176, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. June 15, 1993); Fontaine v. St. Germain's Co., No. CX-92-1842, 1993 WL 121282, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1993); Silvemail v. Lagerquist Corp.. No. C1-92-2099, 1993 WL 107771, at
*2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 1993); Wilson v. Weight Watchers, 474 N.W.2d 380, 384-85 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991); Southwestern Bell Tel. v. Dixon, 575 S.W.2d 596,599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
124. Conerly v. CVN Cos., 785 F. Supp. 801,811 (D. Minn. 1992) (citing Wirig v. Kinney Shoe
Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374,379-80 (Minn. 1990)).
125. Stuempges v. Parke. Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252,257 (Minn. 1980).
126. Turner v. IDS Fin. Servs., No. C5-91-2192, 1992 WL 83313 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1992);
Daywalt v. Montgomery Hosp., 573 A.2d 1116, 1118-19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
127. Smits v. Wal-Mart Stores, 525 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). See also Wirig v.
Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 380-81 (Minn. 1990) (finding no privilege because employer
failed to conduct an adequate investigation of allegations of theft before publicly firing employee at
meeting of all store employees).
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actual malice is not inferred from the communication or
publication even if statements are slander per se.128
Thus, under North Dakota law, the employee must always prove
actual malice (i.e., malice in fact, ill-will, or wrongful motive) to defeat
the qualified privilege. It will not be enough for the employee to simply
show a lack of reasonable grounds or irrelevance to the common interest
or duty.
The Soentgen Court found that the plaintiff failed to defeat the
employer's qualified privilege.129 In Soentgen, the nursing staff
complained about the doctor/employee's competency, so the
hospital/employer independently evaluated the situation. 130 Two hospital
executives discussed the results of the investigation at a meeting with the
doctor.131 The doctor claimed that she was slandered during this
meeting.1 32 Based on these facts, the court found that because the
comments related to the doctor's competency and were discussed only
by those who had a direct interest in the issue, there was no inference of
malice in fact, ill-will, or wrongful motive.133
To defeat the qualified privilege under Minnesota law, an employee
must still prove that the employer acted with malice. 134 However, the
Minnesota courts appear to apply a slightly different standard for
proving malice. As noted in Kletschka v. Abbott-Northwestern
Hospital,135 "[t]o demonstrate malice, [plaintiff] must prove [defendant]
'made the statement from ill will and improper motives, or causelessly
and wantonly for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff."1 36
Applying this standard, Minnesota appellate courts have affirmed
juries' determinations of malice. For example, in one case, the supreme
court upheld a jury's finding of malice where the employer filed a false
128. Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, 467 N.W.2d 73, 79 (N.D. 1991) (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 80.
130. Id. at 76.
131. Id. at 76-77.
132. Id. at 76, 79-80.
133. Soentgen, 467 N.W.2d at 80.
134. See Keenan v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 13 F.3d 1266, 1269-70 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that
once the employer has established the qualified privilege, the burden shifts to the employee to show
abuse of that privilege by proof of actual malice).
135. 417 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
136. Kletschka v. Abbott-Northwestern Hosp., 417 N.W.2d 752. 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(quoting Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980). See also Bauer v.
State, 511 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Minn. 1994) (stating that actual malice can be demonstrated by "intrinsic
evidence" such as "the exaggerated nature of the libel, the character of the language used, the mode
and extent of the publication and other matters in excess of the privilege"); Karnes v. Milo Beauty &
Barber Supply, 441 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that actual malice is "actual ill
will, or intent to causelessly and wantonly injure the plaintiff').
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stolen car report and stated that the employee had retained company
property.137
In another case, the court of appeals affirmed a jury's finding of
malice where a supervisor failed to investigate an incident but
nonetheless fired an employee for "gross misconduct" after stating he
would be "building the appropriate file" to replace the employee.138
Furthermore, the court of appeals upheld a finding of malice in a case
where the employee was terminated upon suspicion of drug use. 139 In
Nicklow v. Menard, Inc.,140 the employee denied drug use, passed a drug
test which he had volunteered to take, and offered to have his person and
truck searched.14 1 The employer fired the employee even though the
tests and searches produced no evidence of drug use. 142 News of the
situation spread to an out-of-state branch of the employer.143 The court
held that these actions, including the "excessive publication" supported
a finding of malice.144
D. CONSENT AND OPINION
1. Consent
An employer may be absolved of liability if the disparaged
employee consents to the publication.145 In Utecht v. Shopko
Department Store,146 the plaintiff's wallet was stolen, so he asked the
defendant to be alert for unauthorized credit card use. 147 The defendant
then posted signs telling cashiers not to accept the plaintiff's cards.148
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that it was a question of fact as to
whether the plaintiff had consented to the method used by the
defendant.149
137. Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng'g, 401 N.W.2d 655,656 (Minn. 1987).
138. Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670, 675 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
139. Nicklow v. Menard, Inc., No. C2-91-2053, 1992 WL 153434 (Minn. Ct. App. July 7, 1992)
(sustaining $75,000.00 verdict for defamed employee).
140. No. C2-91-2053, 1992 WL 153434 (Minn. Ct. App. July 7, 1992).
141. Nicklow v. Menard, Inc., No. C2-91-2053. 1992 WL 153434, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 7,
1992).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
145. Utecht v. Shopko Dep't Store, 324 N.W.2d 652,654 (Minn. 1982); Otto v. Charles T. Miller
Hosp.. 115 N.W.2d 36.39 (Minn. 1962).
146. 324 N.W.2d 652 (Minn. 1982).
147. Utecht v. Shopko Dep't Store, 324 N.W.2d 652.653 (Minn. 1982).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 654.
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In Otto v. Charles T. Miller Hospital,150 an employee was accused of
arson and was told she should discontinue her employment.151 The
employee then brought a union representative to a subsequent meeting
where the charges against her were repeated.152 Under these facts, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had consented to the
publication because it was reasonable for her to have expected the
charges to be repeated at the meeting.153
2. Opinion
As previously noted, generally a defamatory statement must refer to
a fact, not an opinion. Thus, if the alleged defamatory is clearly no
more than an expression of opinion, it likely will not be actionable. 154
IV. PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR REDUCING THE RISK OF
WORKPLACE DEFAMATION LIABILITY
Despite the myriad of situations that give rise to a workplace
defamation claim, there are many things an employer can do to reduce
the risk of liability for such a claim. The following discussion is
intended to offer some practical policies and procedures that employers
may want to implement to reduce potential exposure.
Conduct regularly scheduled employee evaluations. Document
each evaluation, keep them as objective as possible-avoid subjective
adjectives that are subject to misinterpretation. Allow employees to
provide their own input and response to the evaluation. For example,
provide them with space on their evaluation forms to respond to the
evaluators' comments. Distribute the evaluation results to only those
who have a need to see them. Limit access to personnel files to only
those who have a need to see them.
Investigate possible employee misconduct. When alleged employee
misconduct is reported, do not take adverse action against the employee
before investigating the situation as promptly and reasonably as the
circumstances warrant. Do not jump to conclusions or take action
without investigating to ensure there is a reasonable basis for taking the
action. Verify the facts and make decisions based on verified facts and
not on rumors, opinions, or innuendo. If possible, to avoid inconsistent
investigations, have one person trained and designated to handle such
150. 115 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1962).
151. Otto v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 115 N.W.2d 36,37 (Minn. 1962).
152. Id. at 38.
153. Id. at 39.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 30-3 1.
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situations. Before taking disciplinary action, consider having the alleged
action reviewed by another supervisor as a method of checks and
balances. Communicate findings to the employee, and give the
employee the chance to respond, but release findings only to those who
need to know them.
Handle terminations sensitively. Make sure termination is done
only after a proper and thorough investigation. Release information
about the discharged employee to only those in the organization who
need to know. Take action to prevent and/or stop false rumors that
might begin circulating. Minnesota employers should also be aware of
and use the personnel records privilege statute. To the extent possible,
assist the employee in locating new employment. Remember that
lawsuits of this nature are brought by disgruntled employees who believe
they were not treated fairly by the employer. This perception of
unfairness can be greatly reduced if the termination is handled carefully,
respectfully, and sensitively. Consider asking for a signed release from
the employee which authorizes you to release information to prospective
employers who may inquire.
Respond carefully to reference inquiries. Direct inquiries to a
centralized office such as personnel or human resources offices. Verify
the identity of the person seeking the information to confirm that they
have a legitimate need for the information. Insist that inquiries be made
in writing. Disclose only dates of employment, positions held, and
wage/salary information, or keep discussions with prospective employers
limited to other verifiable and objective facts. Avoid giving subjective or
emotional evaluations.
Correct mistakes. Take prompt action to correct any inaccuracies in
information provided about the employee.
Train supervisory personnel in the proper methods of employee
evaluation, investigation and termination. None of the aforementioned
suggestions will be effective unless supervisors are trained in how to
implement them.
V. CONCLUSION
Given that terminated employees generally cannot avail themselves
of contract theories of recovery against their former employers, those
employees routinely seek damages for defamation. When such claims
have gone before juries, verdicts in favor of those employees have been
substantial. Therefore, it is imperative that employers take protective
measures such as those suggested herein, to prevent such unnecessary
and expensive liability.
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